

79276-a

cy 6

11 June 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : O/NE Review of Situation (a) of SE-52, "Probable Consequences in Non-Communist Asia* of Certain Possible Developments in Indochina before Mid-1954", dated 10 November 1953

REFERENCE : Situation (a), SE-52 (Problem a; Assumptions for Problem a; Conclusions, paragraphs 1-5; and Discussion, paragraphs 11-23)

1. The Problem of Situation (a) of SE-52 was as follows:

To estimate the probable reactions and consequences in non-Communist Asia of: (a) the establishment of effective Viet Minh control over Indochina before mid-1954, or; the attainment by the Viet Minh, before mid-1954, of a degree of success which rendered the French Union position in Indochina untenable.

The Assumptions for Situation (a) of SE-52 were: (i) No Chinese Communist intervention in force had taken place; and (ii) no US combat units had been committed.

2. The central point of Situation (a) of SE-52 is that the establishment of Viet Minh control over Indochina would not necessarily result in the rapid communization of the rest of Southeast Asia; but that the future of this area would, among

* Non-Communist Asia, as used in SE-52, included Japan, the ROC, Nationalist China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, the Associated States of Indochina, Burma, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon.

** This implicit estimate is somewhat similarly made in SE-45, "Thailand's Ability to Withstand Communist Pressures or Attacks through Mid-1954", dated 2 June 1953; and in SMIS 63-2-54, "The Effect of Certain Possible Developments on the Military Security and Political Stability of Laos and Cambodia through 1954", dated 1 June 1954. JIC dissented on this point in SE-52, believing that the rest of Southeast Asia would "almost certainly" go. The current position of the agencies on this point has not been ascertained.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

other things, be largely determined by the subsequent policies and actions of the US.

3. We have reviewed Part (a) of SE-52 (paragraphs 1-5, 11-23) and consider the estimates contained therein to be still valid.

4. Moreover, we consider that events subsequent to the publishing of SE-52 would permit the central point of SE-52 - the rest of Southeast Asia would not necessarily fall - to be made with somewhat more confidence. We believe that such developments as the implementation of the armistice in Korea, the success of Viet Minh arms in Indochina, and evident Viet Minh subservience to Communist China and the USSR have caused the governments of Burma, Ceylon, and even India and Indonesia in the past year to recognize Communist objectives and policies in Asia more clearly, and to be somewhat more willing to assume responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, if SE-52 were being prepared today, we feel that this positive shift in the attitudes of these countries would require certain minor amendments to paragraphs 4, 11-15, and 20 of SE-52.

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

O/NE [] from SM 43-54)
Board action, 11 June 1954
Dissemination:
Orig and 3 - DDI for DCI
FE
Reading Room
AD/NE

25X1